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Significance of the Study
The ensuing study has been undertaken to determine how investment
changes as long-term interest rates change. In the comparative analysis of
firms listed under the broad classification of industrials and railroads,
an effort will be made to ascertain whether firms expended more on plant and
equipment when rates were relatively low, or less, when rates were high,
and/or considerable amounts irrespective of the level of long-term interest
rates. Continuing the examination, the analysis will be extended to in¬
corporate interest rates and investments into a concept to establish what
influences, if any, it may exert on changes in the business cycle.
In strict economic theory, four periods comprise the business cycle.
They are, prosperity, recession, depression and recovery. The time of
occurrence is not necessarily in the above order, that is, prosperity may
not come firstj but the order in which they appear, generally follows this
prescribed pattern. In the prosperity phase of the cycle, the economy
approaches a state of full employment. For some economists, full employment
is said to exist idien the basic factors of production, land, labor and
capital, are employed at their optimvim capacity. The following explanation
is given to clarify this generally accepted definition. The term, "optimum
capacity," must first be defined. There are at least two meanings of this
term. First, if all of these factors are employed to any degree, it may be
argued that they are being used to toeir optimum capacity for any given
situation. The second connotation of fullest capacity is that these factors
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are employed so that any alternative use will not bring about any pro¬
portionate increase in their usefullness. There is labor, for example, with
certain technical skills, employed in service capacities. Another exairq3le
is the investment of capital in individual plows when the return on them,
keeping everything but labor constant, would be greater if invested in a
plow machine or its equivalent. The same types of examples could be applied
to land. Present under these illustrations, are elements of both defiuitions
of optimum capacity. Nevertheless, full employment for our purposes, will
be associated with labor. Hence, at levels of full employment, all persons
constituting the labor force, except approximately are employed. Those
individxials comprising the are involuntarily unemployed.
Recession tends to follow a period of prosperity. Generally, unemploy¬
ment of labor and capital begin to exist. Then, the depression cycle "moves
around," Unemployment of these factors is widespreadj investments are re¬
latively low; and a host of other factors are present which contribute to the
disequilibrium position of the economy as a tdiole. Later, the money supply
begins to increase, and/or investment expenditures rise and employment
increases. Now, the economy is in a state of recovery.
This brief synopsis of the business cycle is presented partly as a
background for the data which follow and it also serves to establish the
basis for selecting the period of 1933 through 1939 as the most appropriate
one for this investigation. First, it is the span following a depression
and preceding defense expenditures. Since all of the cycles could be con¬
sidered normal under conditions pertaining thereto, forces operating during
this stage represent no known abnormal or random traits, such as those which
existed after 19Ul which caused our economy to approach a position of
prosperity. The second reason, -tdiich enhances the significance of this study.
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\mderlies changes in investment patterns in the last twenty years. One
striking change has been the increased emphasis on debt financing^ as
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opposed to extemal equity financing. Therefore, an attempt is made to
detennine if this has resulted largely from the decline in long-term interest
rates beginning in the 1930's.
Scope
Certain limitations prevail in a study of this type. For example}
results will not actually prove that firms withhold capital funds, for in¬
vestments, until interest rates fall. Another restriction is the fact that
part of the study will be theoretical and hence, would not necessarily
represent an expression of situations -which, actually may exist.
Even though only a few firms have been selected for the investigation,
they are qiiasi-monopolies and consequently occupy a position of leadership
in their respective fields and possibly other areas through directorate and/or
political control. As a result, there is an inclination for smaller
entreprenevirs to "follow the leader" in the long-run or be "driven" from the
market. Therefore, the sample may reflect a normal trend of the industries
affected.
Previous Studies
Beginning in 1920 and extending through November, 1937, The Harvard
1
An act of financing by borrowing funds primarily from commercial
institutions, if short-term borrowing, or from investment concerns, if long¬
term borrowing, on a principal plus interest basis,
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The financing of enterprises with ownership capital) that is, the
selling of securities such as stocks and/or the flotation of long-term bond
issues. Equity capital is also referred to as risk capital.
k
Graduate School of Business Administration developed a case study on
problems arising when business executives made various decisions. The
investigation involved the sampling method and was composed of 13,119 cases.
Executives from different firms (not recorded) completed questionnaires.
The case study dealt with the influence of interest rates upon the investment
decisions of businessmen. Of the 13,119 cases, fewer than 35 took complete
cognizance of the interest rate factor.
Many economists have sought to link interest rates with changes in the
business cycle and some, such as Keynes and Fisher, have related them to
patterns of investment.
Methods Used in the Investigation
The analysis is divided into two parts. Data for part one are largely
theoretical and deal with interest rates and investnEnt. An effort has been
made to outline various approaches to the determination of interest ratesj
their effect on investments and the effect of both on the business cycle.
Part two is primarily statistical in nature and chiefly embodies material
taken from two sources, namely, Moody’s manuals and the annual reports of




In a study of interest and interest rates, persons with seeniingly
different views, consciously or unconsciously, present similar interpreta¬
tions. Generally, interest is considered the price paid for the use of cash
or its equivalent. "The interest rate" is primarily considered as the ratio
of payment for a "loan of money per unit of money per unit of timej"^ time
being computed on an annual basis. If the loan is discounted, a method
practiced by most banks, there is both a nominal rate and a real rate of
interest. 5y discounting a loan, an amount equal to the quoted rate of interest
is deducted from the principal. If this rate is 6% and loan is for #100.00,
then #6 will be deducted; the borrower receiving #9i|..00. On payment of said
loan, the borrower is required to pay $100.00. Thus, the nominal rate is
6% and the real rate is 6/9k or 6.38^. Through this practice, banks are
realizing a higher rate of interest than many borrowers are led to believe.
Therefore, any admitted differences serve to lie in the determination of
the interest rate. Interest analysts may be divided into two broad groups,
namely, the monetary and non-monetary writers or the classical and anti-
classical theorists. The classical group includes Ricardo, his predecessors
and followers of his doctrines. The non-classical division is dominated
chiefly by the Keynesian approach. The monetary group, substituted for the
3
Harold M. Somers, "The Theory of Interest," Qxiarterly Journal of
Economics, (Mass., 19^0), p. U99.
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non-classicals, acknowledges the Liqtiidity Preference Theory and the Loanable
Fxmds Theory, whereas the Time Preference and Productivity of Capital
Theories represent an outgrowth from the non-monetary or classical group.
Notwithstanding this, there are those who attribute the determination of
'•the interest rate” to a combination of some or all of the previously listed
factors.
Approaches To The Determination of Interest Rates:
Bawerk, Fisher and Keynes
The Time Preference Theory, also known as Agio or Psychological or
Human Impatience Theory, has taken on a general meaning of preference for
present goods over future commodities. For Bawerk, the exponent of this
theory, there are two basic factors which underlie the analysis. The size
of income is one factor. Assuming that there is a systematic unevaluation
of the future, individuals would tend to underestimate their future income
and hence place a higher preference for present goods over futiire goods and
services. Total income for the economy is fixed, but the size of individual
income may fluctuatej depending on the amount loaned or borrowed. Secondly,
there is the degree of risk which is attached to the future. Present events
are commonly known whereas death, representing a future event, is fairly
uncertain as to the exact time of occurrence.
Therefore, to forego present pleasures for future expectations, a
reward must be forthcoming. That reward is an interest payment for abstaining
from current consumption, idiich is also in accord with Senior’s Abstinence
Theory of Interest.^
i;
James Moffat et al., Economics-Principles and Problems (New York, 19U7),
p.
7
The reward, for abstaining from immediate pleasures, will be over and above
the original amount borrowed, in a monetary economy, ceteris paribus, or
there will be no basis for one to alter his present pattern of spending.
Thus, the problem is to induce people to accelerate individual savingsj
lowering their time preference, and hence increasing savings for the whole
economy. Savings will subsequently become investments. Furthermore, an
interest "reward" becomes necessary or a part of the inducement philosophy.
Continuing this analysis, the rate of interest may fall to zero or it
may become negative in a real goods economy. For the rate to become ne¬
gative mder a monetary analysis, one must prefer future over present goods.
Under a real goods economy, the future is also expected to yield less than
the present. However, the number of persons who may prefer future over
present goods, is relatively small or infinitesimal. Therefore, the
determination of the interest rate, under the time preference theory,
assumes a preference for present over future goods.
Under the Productivity Theory of Interest, it is presumed that most
durable goods are reproducible, and therefore interest becomes a payment for
the productivity of capital. The rate, which measures the productivity of
the item, may be positive or it may be negative. The type of rate (positive
or negative will depend on the particular method used in analyzing the
productivity approach. For those who advocate a perpetual positive rate
under this approach, we assume a positive retuni on the initial capital
investment in perpetuity.
However, by employing another variation of the productivity approach,
the rate of interest could conceivably become negative. TrJhen applying this
method, all factors of production, except capital, are kept constant. It
is assumed that positive returns are received from the initial c apital
8
investment. Varying capital, ceteris paribus, and continuously applying it
at a rate in excess of replacement costs, eventually leads to negative returns.
Such returns are inevitable since capital investment, after our initial
employment, is constantly being ’’overcrowdedj” that is, additional outlays,
above replacement, do not bring about increases in income. Thus, at some
point, the cost of capital will exceed the return on the investment thereby
creating a negative rate of interest.
It is also apparent that the long-term rate of interest (under the
productivity approach) is considered in the first method. This is so because
all factors of production have been varied and in the long-run analysis, all
factors are variables. To argue that the rate could become negative
presupposes two conditions. First, it is necessarily a short-run analysis
since some factors will be fixed or kept constant, and secondly, the type of
economy is basically one of real goods.
At this particular point, we shall attempt to clarify the term, ’’the
rate of interest." An implication of this clarification is presented in the
preceding investigation and should become more apparent in the liquidity
preference theory which follows.
Moving out from the basic supply and demand analysis, there could never
be one rate or "the rate of interest," in a competitive economy, unless the
supply and demand curves were permanently elastic. Therefore, "the rate of
interest," as used in this analysis and perhaps understood by others, means
a family of rates for a particular scale.
The Liquidity Preference approach to interest is associated with Keynes,
5
John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(New York, 1935)> p« 166,
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It is the desire to hold cash or its equivalent rather than part with it.
>Jhen one desires to reduce his liquidity, he is rewarded with interest.
Thus, interest becomes a payment for not hoarding or parting with liquidity.
This monetary theory, predicated upon the demand for and supply of
money, consists of three motives. The first one is the transactions motive.
Regardless of the Individual, he will need cash or its equivalent to meet
his personal or business obligations. These responsibilities may be day to
day or bi-monthly or monthly transactions, but nevertheless, they will exist.
The amounts needed for the transactions will vary probably from person to
person but will invariably depend on the size of one's income and its
interval of receipt. Generally, the larger one's income, the higher his
transactions. Secondly, there is the precautionary motive. In addition to
holding money for current transactions, there is a sum held for emergency
uses. On a balance sheet, this sum may be expressed as "reserve for
contingencies." This is a precautionary step where a sum is held to meet,
say, bad debts. Keynes has designated to represent these two motives
which are primarily functions of the level of income and do not vary with the
rate of interest. The third, the speculative motive, is related to gains
in commodity and security markets from the holding of cash. This motive is
represented by Mg and varies with the rate of interest. Even though no
income is forthcoming from these idle balances, people maintain them because
of the speculative motive. Thus, the amount of money that one would hold,
in the form of idle balances at any given time, equals plus
The rate of interest is the price which equates the liquidity preference
with the available quantity of cash. The higher the rate of interest, the
lower the liquidity preference, and vice-versa. The supply and demand curve
may be used to illustrate the point or it may be shovm as in Table 1,
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TABLE 1
SCHEDULE OF INTEREST RATES AND LIQUIDITY DEMAND







The approach implies that monetary authorities can stimulate investment,
on the part of entrepreneurs, by increasing the supply of money. In doing
so, the rate of interest is expected to fall. If, say at 2^, the liquidity
preference or demand curve is infinitely elastic, then an increase in the
money supply will not lower the rate of interest.
Short And Long-Term Interest Rates
For this investigation, we are primarily concerned with the long-term
rate of interest. Accordingly, it is appropriate to make a distinction
between short and long-term rates. Before making this differentiation, we
shall present some factors which affect these two rates.
There may be three factors affecting the short-term ratej namely,
accurate prediction, position of borrowers and lenders and the absence of
investment costs. Let us assume a town with only one commercial bank that
provides the only source of loanable funds. Then, this bank is in a position
to practice monopolistic tendencies since under monopoly, there is presumed
to be only one seller. As a result, it may be able to set or influence rates
within the maximum rate which is set by banking legislation. In doing so, it
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may deal primarily with the reserves, idiich are influenced by regulations
of banking authorities and/or magnitude of loans. If loans become increasingly
high, creating a tendency to lower reserves, the rates may be raised. Mien
the volume of loans decrease and reserves begin to "swell,” rates will
probably fall.
A second element which may be considered as a factor under the short-
tenn rate is the alternate position of borrower and lender. Theoretically,
prospective borrowers could become lenders and vice-versaj that is, those
who seek loans, borrow under existing conditions -vriiere they could easily
lend. Since no costs of investments will be incurred, the amount wanted
would tend to be relatively small.
A third factor, absence of investment costs, is probably self-
explanatory. Any influence on short-term interest rates, positive or
negative, will not be related to an increase or decrease in investment
expenditures, for investment during this period will not be undertaken.
Next, we will consider factors affecting the long-term rate. First,
the long-term rate tends to move towards an average of the short rate and
secondly, it does not fluctuate as widely as the short rate. Note the
contents of Table 2.
TABLE 2
FLUCTUATION OF SHORT AND L0NG-TERI4 RATES
Short-Term Rates Long-Term Rates
3
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A supplementary explanation should help to clarify the table. Mr. Lutz
has eliminated wide fluctuation by including in present long rates, future
changes in the short rates.^ This leads us back to the number one factor, an
arithmetic mean of short-term rates, which makes our number two factor
possible. By accepting this average, prediction, to some degree, is also
possible for the long-term ratej which Lutz fails to acknowledge. What does
remain however, is the fact that the long rate, under these assumptions,
does not fluctuate as widely as the short rate.
If the gap between the short rate and long rate is very wide (assuming
that the long rate is con^jaratively high), then, short-term borrowing will
rise over long-term borrowing to facilitate purchases of long-term
securities. The increase in the money supply on one hand, ceteris paribus,
will lower the long-term rate and simultaneously, the excessive short-term
borrowing on the other hand, ceteris paribus, will cause a rise in short¬
term rates. Therefore, even though bank officials may maneuver their
reserves to influence short-term rates, such rates are also indirectly
affected by changes in the long-term rates.
As an outcome of the preceding forces operating under the short and
long-term rates, it is concluded that the main difference between these
rates is the degree of risk. In illustrating, let us assxmie that one short¬
term and one long-term bond are purchased. The short-term bond is for 60
days and bears 2% interest. The long-term bond is for ij-O years and bears
interest. After 50 days, the interest rate on both bonds rises by 2%,
6
F. A, Lutz, "The Struct\ire of Interest Rates," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, LV (November, iPill), p. 37.
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The short-term bearer can cash in for the principal at the end of ten days
and purchase a short-term bond at the higher rate of interest. The long-
tenn bearer must hold his bond for approximately 39-5/6 years before he can
receive the principal amount without experiencing a loss on the initial
pxirchase. Thus, the longer the bond maturity (asstiming a change in the rate
of interest), the greater the degree of risk.
CHAPTER III
IWESTl'IEI'JT THEORY
Gross vs. Net Investment
In beginning a discussion of investment analysis, we must first
clarify investment, net investment and gross investment. There is
substantial agreement by writers on these definitions.
For our purposes, we are concerned with capital investment, as it
relates to a business firm, -sdiich is synonymous with capital outlay. Thus,
investment, per se, simply refers to the acqtdsition of a fixed asset,
whether it be old or new, which is expected to yield a return, in excess of
its cost, over a period of time. In acquiring ownership of this asset, it
is necessary that one, in return, give up another (current or fixed) asset
or acquire it at the expense of other(s). That is, in the absence of an
exchange among parties directly affected, a third party must bear the cost
of the asset in question.
This fixed or capital asset is known as producers’ plant and durable
equipment. It may be called capital outlay or capital outlay and eqtiipment
or producers’ goods or real investment. Invariably, the meaning is the
same. It represents those goods used in the further production of goods
to be sold on the market, after completion, at some future date. The
market goods are technically called consumer goods for they will ultimately
be ptirchased by the public.
Buyers express preferences for commodities through the expenditures of
dollars and/or through public opinion polls. As a result, these goods are
produced and/or increased or decreased in quantity and sometimes in quality.
15
For original production, the producer must install certain equipment, after
acquiring plant, which will enable him to produce these economic goods.
Thus, the demand for producers' goods is a derived demand? derived from
consumer preferences or consumer demand.
Gross Investment
Capital investment may be divided into two broad categories, namely,
gross investment and net investment. The main difference between the two
lies primarily within factors idiich comprise their composition. Gross
investment includes, (a) the purchase of producers' durable equipment?
(b) new construction which is synonymous with plants in the process of being
built? (c) net foreign investment, which "is the net change in international
7
assets Sind liabilities." This net investment measures first, the excess of
domestic goods sold abroad over purchases of foreign output and secondly,
the production abroad of home owned (United States) resources over the
production of reso\irces in The United States owned by foreign industrialists?
and (d) changes in business inventories which are shown annually in most
corporation tax returns, accounting for about four-fifths of the estimate
value of non-farm inventories.
Net Investment
Net investment is the net addition to capital equipment. Keynes points
out that this addition can consist of fixed capital, xdiich is a form of
durable equipment, and/or working capital, xdiich accounting-wise, is the
7
United States Department of Commerce, National Income Supplement to
the Survey of Current Business, Government Printing Office, 1951, p. 53.
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difference between current assets and current liabilities, and/or liquid
capital, often thought of as cash. Long-term planning probably enters into
both gross and net investment decisions. However, when net investment is
undertaken, it materializes primarily because of past profits with the idea
that this trend (apparently upward) will continue for a definite period.
Other factors, such as prices of goods and rates of interest, may be
considered secondai^r even though they will have a bearing on the profit
schedule. Net and gross investuEnt are examined in Chapter V,
Factors Affecting The Level of Private Investment:
Expectation and The Rate of Interest
Emerging from an examination of any type of investment will be factors
which directly or indirectly affect the level of investment. The factors
may be dependent upon or independent of each other. The factor most widely
accepted by economists is expectation. The second factor, the rate of
interest, is more subjective and hence, does not have as wide acceptance.
Before entering into a discussion of these two factors, certain
subsidiary terms must be defined. They are national income, constimption and
savings. Investments have previously been defined in this chapter. The
meaming of these secondary tentis represents nothing new but are defined for
purposes of associating them with investment.
The first term, national income, is the aggregate earnings of labor
and property which results from the production and sale of goods and services.
This is the gross amount and is distinguished from net income by deducting
depreciation, taxes and other forms of payment to the government. It may
be called net or disposable income in that it represents the amount left or
at one's disposal which is available for distribution at his discretion.
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The amount will vary among individuals and sections of the country and will
depend on the production realization of the economy. Net income has also
been defined as that amount available for consumption.
Consumption is the value of goods and services consumed during a period.
Savings is the excess of net income over expenditures on consumption.
Income, being equal to the value of total output, is also equal to
consumption expenditures plus expenditures on investment. Savings become
the excess of income minus consumption and therefore, equal to investment.
This is statistically shown in Table 3»
TABLE 3
SAVING DEFINED AS KiUAL TO INVESTMENT
Income
Value of
Total Output Consumption Investment
600 - 600 s Uoo + 200
Income Consumption Saving
600 Uoo - 200
Retuniing to our premise, we find that expectation or the anticipated
net return is a universal factor of paramount importance (except to persons
or organizations of the philanthropic type) when investments are under
consideration. For example; entrepreneurs would not invest in capital
equipment unless the expected return on such an investment was greater than
the cost of this investment.
The firm is assumed to plan its investment in terms of the relationship
between expected net returns on a new investment and the interest payment
18
necessary for the acquisition of the capital* Expectation and the rate of
interest are the dominant factors affecting the level of private investment.
CHAPTER 17
INVESTMENT DEMAND
Changes in the Business Cycle
Introductory statements of (l) periods in a business cycle and (2)
factors affecting investment, were introduced in Chapters I and III. In
This chapter, an attempt will be made to broaden those concepts and, pari
passu, show their effects on business cycle activity.
These basic terms tend to attach more significance to the micro
Q
economic analysis that we are presenting. As we have seen, the four major
periods of a business cycle are prosperity, recession, depression and
recovery. Diu'ing any one of these periods, there is a change in the econony.
This change is of four types: seasonal, secular, cyclical and residual. By
seasonal is meant those fluctuations which generally occur during a
particular period of the year, such as those in construction, farming, etc.
Secular trends represent long-term growth or decline in economic activity.
For example; since 1930, the total amount of investment has been upward.
Cyclical fluctuations have been designated to express the recurrent changes
in economic activity which are not caused by seasonal, secular or random
factors. Lastly, residual events are occurrences not covered by the
previously named three. Two classical examples of the latter are (1) war
and (2) a phenomenon, such as an earthquate, which is considered an act of
God.
8
The micro analysis concerned with units or segments of the economy,
as contrasted with macro economics which attaches significance to the
economy as a whole.
19
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We will stai*t with investment expenditvires which are assumed to be
dependent primarily upon the marginal efficiency of capital. This is equal
to the rate of return over the cost of the good or for the Keynesian analysis,
it is the relationship between the expected net rate of return on a new
capital asset and the rate of interest. When the rate of interest falls,
the marginal efficiency of capital is increased usually, stimulating
investment on the part of the entrepreneur. Simultaneously, the liquidity
preference schediile of individuals is increased. As the entrepreneur
expands investment, employment tends to increase. Later, income expands.
With the continued purchases of capital outlay, the price of the capital
good tends to rise due to a decrease in bank reserves and/or a decrease in
the supplier’s stock. This forces a decrease in the liquidity preference
schedule, due primarily to a favorable outlook for profits, and hence a
release of savings for investment purposes; which results in increased
capital outlay. Incomes are increased, followed by an increase in consumption
of some consumer goods. Now, the economy approaches a state of prosperity.
When investment ceases, the boom draws to a close, creating a period
of recession viiich inevitably is succeeded by a depression. The cessation
of these expenditures happens because of one or more factors. First, there
apparently is no further need (presently) for capital outlay. Secondly,
anticipated earnings are decreasing and thirdly, the cost of the good
begins to overtake the selling price. For Keynes, the marginal efficiency
of capital is or is becoming negative. It is a ’’sudden collapse in the
0
marginal efficiency of capital," rather than a rise in the rate of interest
9
J, M. Keynes, o£. cit.. p. 315
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which brings the fall in the rate of investment.
To present another point of view, the boom corfLd be the effect of
•underconsumption if we apply the acceleration principle. Since the demand
for capital goods is a derived demand, demand for investment goods arises
because of a demand by ultimate consumers. Under the acceleration approach,
any increase or decrease in consumer expenditures brings about a greater
increase or decrease of capital investment. This happens because the
entrepreneur meets the initial consumer demand increase by greater
expenditures on capital (assuming no idle outlay), which he believes will
produce commodities to meet the future effective demand as anticipated from
the present trend. If there is a leveling off of consumer expenditures, he
curtails capital expenditures^ since what he possesses is presumed to
produce enough (along with existing stocks) for the existing effective
demand. As consumer spending tapers off, capital investment is reduced by
a greater proportionate amount.
Several positions may be presented in describing the movement from a
depression period to a state of recovery. Schumpeter introduces the concept
of innovations which stimulate investment. These innovations, representing
forces outside of the market, appear en mass. They may consist of new
products or new sales programs or new technological processes and are
generally not available to all sellers in the short-run. As a result,
sellers are rewarded in the fom of ’’-wind fall” profits. This indicates
that the market, presently, is operating at something other than pure
competition, since under purely competitive conditions, marginal cost would
equate marginal revenue? a point representing the maximization of the profits
of any given firm. 'When short-run or "-wind fall" profits exist, marginal
revenue exceeds marginal cost. If these innovations were available to all
22
sellers simiiltaneously, no short-run profits would exist. However, in the
long-rvin, "imitators” follow, thereby reducing or causing these "wind fall"
profits to disappear. Hence, they are reduced or tend to disappear as a
consequence of all firms becoming more and more coirqjetitive. Marginal
revenue then equates or approximates marginal cost.
Another approach which indicates the shift in the cycle phase is that
of Keynes, supported, in effect, by Fisher. The upswing comes when
businessmen sinticipate profitability in capital outlays. The marginal
efficiency of capital begins to increase. Investors grow optimisticj costs
of construction are lowj final inventories are liquidated and it becomes
necessaiy to tindertake some investment for repairs and replacement. Sinoe
consumption is given at the level of income, government expenditures may be
needed to supplement private expenditures. Alvin Hansen sums this up very
well:
A society geared to a high peak load of capital-goods production is
likely to experience violent fluctuations in income and employment. A
high savings economy will remain a highly dynamic economy as long as it
is able to experience periodically great bursts of capital outlays on
plant and equipment. It is then a dynamic, rapidly expanding, and
progressive economy, despite its instability. But if such an economy
fails to find adequate investment outlets for its new savings and for its
depreciation allowances, it will lose its dynamic quality and become a
depressed economy, with a large volume of chronic unemployment, \mless,
indeed, the Government assumes a more positive role. The high savings
economy, barring Government intervention, can escape a fall in income
and employment only through the continuous development of new outlets
for capital expenditures. As far as private-investment outlets are
concerned, this requires continuous technological progress, the rise of
new industries, the discovery of new resources, the growth of
population, or a combination of several or all of these developments.
10
Alvin H. Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles (New York, 19l4l),
pp. 3l4.6-3li7.
23
Therefore, it is almost certain that income, investment, consumption
and government expenditures are interdependent variables, present in our




To begin the empirical investigation, the concept of capital outlay
Twill be broadened in order that one may better understand its significance
in relation to managerial decisions*
To appropriate a given amount for capital investment, such as plant
and equipment, involves many factors \Ai±ch must be adjusted to long range
planning. Since it is presumed first, that the return to this capital will
be progressively forthcoming and secondly, that the outlay will be absolute ^
for long periods of time? it is mandatory that decisions pertaining to
capital investment be of a long-run natvire if the enterprise adheres to the
law of profit maximization or minimization of losses.
One factor may be the approximate time length that any proposed plan
would cover. Even though the long-run may be referred to as that period
necessary for the entrepreneur to vary plant and equipment, it becomes
necessary when actual planning begins, to think in terms of a time limit.
During this planning period, the entrepreneur will decide if the plan of
expansion should cover any given number of years in respect to the present
or anticipated sales trend of the coinmodltie(s) produced by the Industry in
question. Secondly, there is the factor of capital requirements. How
much should be expended and would it be available for such project? The
11
Absolute, as used here, refers to plant outlays as not normally
possessing rates of movement, from source to source, as often or as steady
as other factors? for example, income.
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araoiint of capital required represents usually, the cost of the program. In
the event of other programs, expansion or otherviise, the rationalization of
fluids would take placej the planners deciding if this project could be
postponed or expenditures reduced in light of more urgent programs.
Furthermore, there would be the task of computing the rate of return to
each project and finally deciding if it would be feasible to carry out or
abandon the less profitable ones.
Thirdly, how will the capital be supplied? There are two main sources,
namely, internal and external. If internal, a problem arises as to the
amount to be expended and that portion which will be retained. Externally,
the company may be able to secure investment loans and/or resort to equity
financing by turning over securities to brokers for sale.
Consequently, investments are inherently geared to long-run considerations.
Moreover, the time from the point of origin to physical completion of the
investment may be many weeks.
The present investigation examines seven firms. Four of the companies.
United States Steel, Bethlehem, Republic and Inland, represent the steel
industry. General Motors and Chrysler represent the automobile industry.
The seventh, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Detroit Railroad Company, has been '
included to illustrate the tremendous capital outlay requirements for that
type of organization. The Ford Motor Company, considered as one of the
”big three'* of the automobile industry, has been omitted from this study
because of its private ownership? making it very difficult, if not impossible,
to become acquainted with its financial records. Therefore, only two of the
leading firms for the industry are analyzed. The investigation is for the
years 1933-1939.
We have included the bond rating for some of the issues. Those bonds
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without ratings were issued privately and/or did not possess all of the
qualifications for a rating as prescribed by Moody. Bonds are rated from
Aaa to Caa. Beginning with the former, such bonds possess the highest
degree of investment quality. As the rating is progressively lowered,
investment risk is progressively greater.
The bonded debt of companies, in the investigation, is generally that
of the parent firm. Basically, it represents those issues which were
relevant to the study.
We conclude the investigation with a correlation analysis showing the
relationship between investments and rates of interest for the steel and
automobile industries.
The Steel Industry
The steel industry, producer of the basic industrial metal (steel) and
the largest single producer of cement, ranks among the most important in the
country. Of the total primary metal output of all types in the United States,
steel accomts for approximately 95 per cent. It is produced at a lower
cost than competing metals and is not a homogeneous commodity; being
available in more than 100,000 combinations of chemical composition, form,
size and physical properties. Steel is considered as a raw material or a
producers* good. Producers’ goods, which are used in the further production
of goods, are generally capable of providing services over longer periods
of time than consumers' goods which depreciate or deteriorate relatively
faster. Storage is a good example. Steel per se, can be stored for long
periods without serious impairment.
Some factors that influence steel sales are consumer income, cost,
stocks of durable goods, sale price of steel, etc. The latter, sale price.
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is about the most important factor which influences the quantity of steel
that will be sold. Entrepreneurs generally attempt to maximize profits.
In calculating the price, the producer must consider, among other things,
the amount of disposable income potential customers possess or will possess.
Furthermore, an analysis is made to determine the portion distributed among
the income class(es) most concerned with steel purchases. Closely allied
with the selling price is the cost of production. The net gain or net loss
is the difference between the cost and the selling price.
Since the industry produces the basic industrial metal and is further
considered as the world's largest single producer of cement, industrial
production is very high, with a mandatory huge investment in fixed capital.
Inasmuch as the industry is dominated by three firms, this huge capital
investment is concentrated. Moreover, by its nature and virtue of its size,
the industry becomes a quiasi-monopoly. This is further observable when one
considers the huge capital requirements} making it theoretically impossible
to have free entry into this particular market.
The States where most of the steel production is located are Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Wisconsin and Alabama. They represent regions
where most of the minerals used in making steel are located. Secondly,
they are generally water areas. Thirdly, they are districts where maiqr
consumer products are made of or from steel. Hence, the shipping charges,
if paid by consignor, are lower than they would be if steel were processed
in other regions.
Capital Outlay
The industry operates on a mass production basis and therefore invests
heavily in capital goods. The main equipment, such as blast furnaces and
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open hearth furnaces cost about $2.5 million and $500,000 each, respectively.
Under the former, ores are smelted whereas the latter are used primarily
for regenerating properties.
Beginning in 1933* United States Steel, the largest firm in this group,
expended $39 million for capital improvements. Their gross accoimt for
this particular year was over $2 billion (as exhibited in Table 10).
Bethlehem, the second largest single producer of steel, had expenditures of
$2 millionj whereas Republic, considered as the world's third largest single
producer of steel, recorded additions amounting to $6 million. Thus, the
"big three" of steel accounted for about 9h% of the total capital investment
for the industry ($50 million) for this period. None of these companies
issued bonds for 1933* However, at this time, they had ten and twenty year
bonds outstanding; for the purpose of capital improvements. The total
funded debt for the steel and iron industry for 1933 was $14.76 million.
For the year 193ht United States Steel again led the steel group in
capital expenditiires. The company spent $5l million. In 1933, approximately
$UU million was appropriated from earnings for this purpose. Even though
there was not a bond issue for the two years, it could reasonably be
assumed that $7 million of the $5l million represented funds from long-term
bond issues already outstanding. Bethlehem had expenditures of over
$2 million for the second year, preceded by Republic with $9 million.
During this yeah, only Republic floated a bond issue. It bore a 5i rate
of interest and was issued in part payment for assets of the Corrigan-
McKinney Steel Company. Like Bethlehem, it is difficult to estimate the
amount spent from bond funds (on capital improvements), but it is practical
to say that part of the total expenditure on such in5)rovements represents
f\inds from long-term bond issues. This assumption is based on previous
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issues as shown in Tables i|.,5»6 and 7» The Inland Steel Company registered
a decline of $3 million in its capital accoimt. Total funded debt was
$1+^8 millionj a decrease of $18 million over the year.
In 1935> United States Steel expended approximately $58 million for
additions to capital goods. Appropriations in 193U (from earnings) were
million. Again, it may be presumed that about $13 million came from
long-term bond issues. There is evidence of this upward trend in capital
expansion by a quotation from the 193U Annual Report of United States Steel
Corporation:
Changed conditions in the iron and steel industry during the last
few years, both in respect of quality and character of steel demanded by
customers, including broadening uses of alioy and special steels,
together with revisions in type of mechanical mills evolved for treatment
and rolling of steel which effect large reductions in current production
cost but requiring greater capital investments, make it necessary for
the subsidiaries to expend, during the next few years, large amounts for
capital purposes,,,In February, 1935, there were appropriated $14.7,000,000
to be expended for these purposes,12
Bethlehem, for the same period, registered additions of $2U million.
During this period, 1935, the company floated a twenty-five year bond
issue, the purpose of which was not recorded. The outstanding amount was
$55 million as shown in Table 5» During the previous year, only Republic
listed a bond flotation. This issue bore a 52^ rate of interest. Thus,
between the two firms, the rate of decline was 1^ points. Though Republic
recorded no bond issues for 1935, expenditures for additions were $11
million. Inland Steel also floated no bond issues but the company's capital
acco4int listed an increase of $5 million over the year. Total expenditures.
12
John Moody, Moody's Manual of Investments? Industrials (New York,
1935), p, 1178, quoted from the 193^ Annual Report of United States Steel
Corporation,
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for the industry at large, were $122 million. United States Steel accounted
for hB»9% of this total (as deducted from Table 8) whereas, the "big three"
expended about 76% of the total (as calculated from table 9). The total
funded debt was |?|)|}| million.
For the year 1936, capital expenditiires and bond flotations were
accelerated. United States Steel continued to set the pace by expending
$85 million or 14.2,5^ of total capital expenditures for this period. Of the
$85 million, $14.7 million represented appropriations from earnings in 1935*
Thus, we presume that $38 million came from long-term bond issues,
Bethlehem's expenditures were $15 million or a decrease from last
year of $9 million. During this period, the company floated a 3-3/14- bond
issue; with $53 million outstanding. The net proceeds were used primarily
to retire outstanding issues bearing a rate of interest of $% and to provide
for cost of future betterments and improvements. It was a thirty year, A
rating issue which is Included in Table 5. The price was not listed. The
list of bonds retired from this issue were due, beginning with 1937 and
extending through 1950, Thus, the corporation apparently believed that the
rate of interest would not fall below 3-3/U^ for at least the next
fourteen years; at least, this is one assumption. Expenditures for Republic
were $18 million, exceeding Bethlehem, the second single largest producer
of steel, by $7 million. As may be seen from Table 6, at least a portion of
this amount, for this and subsequent years, is from long-term bond issues
since the company issued (several years back) ten, twenty and thirty year
bonds for this purpose. Republic floated two bond issues, recorded in
Table 6, during this year. Both were issued at a k^% rate of interest. The
purpose of the "Republic Steel Corporation-General Ug's, Series B," was to
redeem eight previous issues, due in 1936, which bore interest rates of 5»
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6 and !%• The other issue, Gulf States Steel Corporation-lst. (closed)
U^'s, sold at 99”1/16 and possessed a Baa rating. The purpose was threefold.
First, to provide for cost of additions to the Gadsden Plantj secondly, to
retire an issue of debenture 5's, and thirdly, for extensions, j^etterments
and working capital. This callable bond bears a matvirity date of 1961,
making it a twenty-five year issue. During the same period, Bethlehem
floated a 3-3/U^ issue. The difference between Bethlehem's 3-3/i| issue
and Republic's J4.4 issue may lie within the rating. The fomer possessed an
A rating whereas the latter was a Baa. The meaning behind this is that the
A bond was more firmly secured than the one with a rating of Baa. This
security includes, among other things, the general position of the company,
its earnings schedule, and its total outstanding debt; particularly in
relationship to its current ratio. A brief synopsis of bond rating is
included in the introduction of this chapter.
Inland's capital account for 1936 was $9 million or an increase from
last year of million. D-uring the year, the company floated at least two
bond issues; namely, "Inland Steel Company first 3's, Series C," and "Inland
Steel Company first S.F. 3-3A's, Series D." The former's maturity date
began with 1937 and extended through 19U6. The issue was for $10 million.
The latter's maturity was 1961; a twenty-five year issue, with an outstanding
amount of $35 million. The purpose of both issues was first, to redeem
Series A (li^'s) due in 1978, and Series B (Ug's) due in 1981; and secondly,
provide for other corporate purposes. The ciifference in interest rates,
since both were A rating issues, apparently resulted in the time of issue;
that is, the lapse of time between issues could have been of such nature that
the market rate increased or decreased. Another possible reason lies within
the method of selling. One could have been a private issue and/or sold to
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a particiilar bank at a discount, etc. This could (also) have been the
reason(s) for the difference in interest rates between Bethlehem’s 34 and
issues, mentioned earlier, even though they bore different ratings.
Total capital expenditures for the industry were |200 million. The four
firms listed in this analysis accounted for about of this total. The
funded debt for the industry was million; an increase of $60 million
from 1935.
These firms under study, beginning with 1937 and moving counter clock¬
wise, have shown steady increases in plant investment. This trend is based
largely on the fact that all of them are engaged in programs of expansion
which were completed by 1938, Included in Inland Steel's Annual Report of
1937, are data which help to verify this expansion movement:
The program of construction for additions and improvements during
the year 1937, including the building of a blast furnace..., a battery of
coke ovens, a Ult-inch U-high strip mill with auxiliary facilities, and
five additional hearth furnaces, with estimated annual capacity of
Ul4.0,000 tons of ingots, is nearing completion and, in the main, can be
placed in commission as soon as business conditions permit. This
program was completed in 1938 and the new additions are now in operation.
Expenditures for the additions and improvements made by your company
and its subsidiaries for the year 1937 amomted to $23,296,098.15
Taking Inland first for 1937# we find that the company floated a bond
issue bearing a 3% rate of interest. The rating and price are not given
since the issue was sold privately to Kuhn, Loeb and Company at a discount
of 1^, However, the purpose was to reimbxirse the company's treasury for
capital expenditures made in 1936 and to provide funds for additional
outlays on its properties in 1937. Thus, the amount expended in 1936 and
13
John Moody, Moody's Manual of Investments; Industrials (New York,
1939)# p. 3057, quoted from the 19^7 Annual Report of Inland Steel
Corporation,
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1937j included funds, the exact amoimt not registered, which came from long¬
term bond issues. The 3/S rate is equal to one of the company's issues for
1936 and 3A^ lower than the other issue for the same period. Republic had
expenditmres of $39 millionj an increase from 1936 of $21 million. This
company floated at least three Baa bond issues during this period. They
bore maturity dates of 19^0, 1936 and 1961, with respective outstanding
amounts of $70 million, $23 million and $137 million.
During 1937, Republic floated at least three Baa issues. The pui7)ose
of "Republic Steel Corporation General Convertible It-J's Series A" was first,
to redeem three outstanding issues bearing rates of interest of 3 and 1%^
and secondly, for other corporate p\irposes. The pvirpose of Series B was
threefold. First, for redemption; secondly, to reimburse company for 30^ of
cost of acquisition of lit.,689,000 debentures of Trumbull-Cliff Furnace
Company; and thirdly, to reimburse company for capital expenditures made or
to be made after September, 1933• Series C was used for allocations to
plant improvement and construction of new equipment. The company expended
$39 million for additions to capital outlay, most of which apparently came
from long-term bond issues. Bethlehem's capital expenditures for 1937
amounted to $ii.3 million; an increase over the year of $30 million. It
represents the largest amount of capital expenditures, recorded for
Bethlehem, for the period of this investigation. Vfe have no issue for U, S,
Steel during 1937. The company issued, thirty years ago (as of 1939),
several thirty, forty and fifty year bonds which are still outstanding. So
sums for expenditures, representing funds from bond issues, have progressively
resTilted from previously authorized and subsequently issued bonds. This
firm expended approximately $111 million during 1937 and like Bethlehem,
Republic and Inland, it also represented the largest amount on capital
3h
expenditures during the period of 1933-1939* In 1936, over million was
appropriated from earnings. Thus, we continue to assume that it is very easy
to state the amount expended from bond issues for U. S. Steelj the araoxmt
for this year being $70 million or 35»1^ of the total for the industry.
Bethlehem followed with lh»2% and Republic had 10.1^ of the total. The
four firms, including Inland, had capital expenditures amounting to about
68.9^ of the total forlhe industry. The total ftinded debt for the steel
industry for 1937 was $l|.96,95J4-,OOOj a year's decrease of $8 million.
The effects of the expansion programs are seen from a general tapering
off of investments for 1938. During the year, U. S. Steel issued its first
and only bond for this period of investigation. It was a 3i debenture due
19U8. $50 million was for "repayment" of bank loans and the other $50
million would be used for completion of new facilities. There was a decline
of $U8 million or UW from 1937, in capital expenditures. The amount
expended this year was $63 million, or k7% of the total for the industiy.
liJhile expenditures for U. S. Steel declined kh%j total expenditures for the
industry declined In 1936, the company appropriated $60 million for
purposes of capital improvements. Thus, of the $63 million spent, only
$3 million will be estimated as the amount received from bond issues.
Bethlehem also had a decline in expenditures. The company expended only
$7 million or 81i^ less than last year or 88,8$ less than U. S, Steel spent
for 1938. Following the downward trend. Republic spent $U million on
capital additions, representing an 89.7$ decrease from 1937 or 93.6$ less
for the year than U. S. Steel. The "big three" of steel accounted for 56$
of total capital expenditures for the industry. The funded debt for the
industry was $667,37U,OOOj an increase over the year of $171 mllion, as
seen from data in Table 11. Thus, there was a decline in capital expenditures.
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for individual firms, whereas the funded debt for the industry was increased.
Although this is pointed out, it does not necessarily follow that the funded
debt is associated entirely with capital expenditures.
United States Steel, for 1939j had capital expenditures of $88 million
or an increase of 39*6^ from 1938. Of this $88 million, $38 million was
received from bond issues since $50 million was retained from previous
earnings. Bethlehem floated no bond issues for this period. The company
spent $11 million on capital improvements j thereby having an increase over
1938 expenditures of 57^. Neither Republic nor Inland registered any bond
flotations for 1939. However, Republic's expenditures of $9 million were
125^ more than the previous year. The three leading companies accounted
for 75% of total expenditures. The total, $190 million, was hk% less than
1938. The funded debt for the industry was $651,908,000,
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TABLE U
UNITED STATES STEEL: BONDED DEBT
(1933-1939)
1. St, Clair Fixmace Company First Gold 5 , due serially to 1939. Dated
1910. Not callablej coupon. Outstanding: #580,000. Rating Aaa.
Average Price
1933 193U 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
100 102i IOI4-7/8 . 106 103i lOU
2, Illinois
callablej
Steel Company Gold debenture Ui’
coupon. Rating Aaa.
Average Price
, due I9UO. Dated 1910j
®
Outstanding: #18 million.
1933 193U 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
100-3/16 105-3/8 107i 108| 107-1/8 106 103
3. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co., General Gold 5g, due 1951. Dated
1901. Couponj not callablej outstanding: #11 million. Rating Aaa.
1933 193U
Average Price
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
101 109 117-3/8 123-1/8 120| 122-1/16 122i
li. American Steel & Wire Company of Alabama First Gold 5g, due 19ii6.
Dated 1916. Couponj callable at 102. Outstanding: #1,14.22,000.5.H. C. Frick Coke Company, Pittsburg, purchase money gold Bsf due
serially 19i|ll-} dated 1911. Couponj outstanding: #6,14.82,000j Rating Aaa,6.United States Steel Corporation Debenture 34g, due 19l48j dated 1938.
Callablej coupon. Rating Aaa. Purpose: #50 million for repayment of
bank loansj $50 million for completion of new facilities.7.United States Steel Corporation, collateral Trust Gold 5sj due 1951.
Dated 1901. Not callablej coupon. Outstanding: #269,000.
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TABLE 5
BETHLEHEM STEEL: BONDED DEBT
(1933-1939)
Matxirity Outstanding Rat.
1. Bethlehem Steel Co., purchase money
gold 6_; not callable,s 1978 $ 7,500,000 Aaa
2, Bethlehem Steel 1st, lien & refunding
gold 5s. 19i;2 12,759,000 A
3. Penn-Mary Steel Company First sinking
fund gold s
Purpose: Issued as the piirchase price
properties and plants of the
American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co





li. Penn-Mary Coal Company first sinking
fund gold closed mortgagej
callable? coupon. 1939 Uii5,ooo A
5. Penn-Mary Coal Co., 1st. sinking fund
gold 5_ (closed) callable? coupon,s 1939 2,180,000 Baa
6. Jamison coal & Coke Co., Dakota, 1st,
s.f, gold 5_? coupon? callable at 105
9
193U 176,000 A
7. Finch Run Coal Co., purchase money
sinking fund? gold 5g closed?
dated 1920? coupon? callable. 1950 3,156,000 Baa
8. Lackawanna Steel Co,, first con¬
solidated A, gold 5s, coupon. 1950 6,i;92,000 A
9, Midvale Steel & Ordnance Company
convertible sinking fund gold 5s>
dated 1916? coupon. 1936 31,507,000 A
10. Pittsburgh-Westmoreland Coal Co,,
1st. sinking fund gold 5g« 19U7 2,U85,000 Baa






12. Maniifacturer's Water Co., 1st s.f. 5g» 1939 $ 1,002,000 Baa
13. Bethlehem Steel Company ptirchase
money & improvement s.f. gold 5g
dated 1916; callable.
Purpose: Issued to enable the Penn-
Mary Steel Co., to finance
the purchase of all the
assets of the Penn. Steel
Co., consisting chiefly of
plants. 1936 22,30U,000 A
lU. Bethlehem Steel Corporation
Consolidated s.f. gold 5g Series C. 1981 —
l5. Pacific Coast Steel Corporation
Serial Gold 5g, series A to J;
dated 1929j coupon. 33-UO 9,293,000 Baa
Purpose: Issued in connection with
the acquisition of the
properties of Pacific Coast
Steel Co., & Southern Calif.
Iron & Steel Company.
16. McClintic-Marshall Construction Co.,
Collateral Trust gold 5i_»s 33-37 9,826,000 Baa
17. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Serial gold itl^g. 33-Ul 10,176,000 Baa
Purpose: $8,200,000 issued in part
payment for the properties and
business of McClintic-Marshall
Corp. Balance for other Corp purp.
18. Kalman Steel Co., 1st. mortgage gold 6g. 33-39 157,000 Baa
19. Bethlehem Steel Corp. s.f. gold •
s
I960 55,000,000 A
20. Bethlehem Steel Corp. s.f. issued 1936
Series E 3-3/ki
Purpose: Net proceeds used to retire
1966 53,022,000 A
entire outstanding amoxints of:
1. Penn-Mary Steel 1st $ due 1937
2. Finch Run Coal PM due 1950
3. Pittsburgh-Westmoreland due 19h7
i;. Union Coal & Coke 5= due 19U6
$3,000,000 used to provide for cost of
future betterments & improvements.
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TABLE 6
REPUBLIC STEEL: BONDED DEBT
(1933-1939)
1. Dormer Steel Co., 1st. PM ^g.
2. Central Steel Company 1st.
s.f. gold 8g.
Purpose: Issued in part, to pay
for $3,500,000 current
indebtedness.
3. Witherow Steel Corp, 1st s.f.
gold 6^;
Purpose: Issued in part, to retire
securities of predecessor
company. 1932 1952 61;3,000 B
U. Interstate Iron & Steel Go.,
first s.f. gold ^2- Series
A & Bj coupon; callable
Issued Maturity Outstanding Rat.
1915 1935 $ 619,000 Ba
1932 i9ia 3,065,000 Ba
Purpose: Series A - issued to
refund outstanding
bonded indebtedness.
Series B - issued to
provide funds for
additions, 1926 19i;6 Ba
5. Republic Iron & Steel Co.,
refunding & G. s.f. $2^ Series A.
Purpose: To reimburse the
company for additions
and improvements. 1923 1953 6,267,000 Ba
6. Republic Steel Corp, PM 1st.
convertible 523.
Purpose: Issued in part payment
for assets of the
Corrigan-McKinney
Steel Company. 193k 195U l5>361,000 Baa
ho
Issued Maturity Outstanding
7. Republic Steel Corp. Gen.
Series B. 1936 1961 !|U$,000,000
Purpose: Issued to redeem:a.Republic Iron & Steel 5g 1936
b» TrumbtiU Steel Co. 6g 1936
c. Donner Steel Co. 7s 1936
d. Interstate Iron & Steel
at 101; 1936
e. Witherow Steel 6g (103) 1936
f. Steel & Tubes 63 (102) 1936
g. Trumbull-Cliffs 6 (105) 1936
h. Union Draw Steel tl05) 1936
8. Republic Steel Coitj. Gen. itfg
Series Bj callable. 1937 1961 137,202,000
Purpose:
a. Redemption
b. Reimburse Co., for ^0% cost
of acquisition of $3,689,000
deb, of Trumbull-Cliff
Furnace Company.
$U,997,500 to reimburse Co, for
capital expenditures made or to
be made after Sept, 1935.
1936 - lOOi - 951
9. Republic Steel Corp., Gen. Conv,
ii§s» Series Aj callable. 1937 1950 70,070,000
Purpose: Issued (for redemption)
a, $2,8U6,000 Newton Steel 1st 7
b, Donner Steel Company ^ ®
c, $1,881,000 Trumbull Steel
“^ompany deb, 7s






Issued Maturity Outstanding Rat.
10. Republic Steel Corp. Gen.




& construction of new
eqiapment. Balance for
other corporate purposes.
1936 - 99-3A - 98-1/8
11. Gulf States Steel Corp. 1st.
(closed) s.f. j callablej coupon.
1936 1961 6,192,000 Baa
Purposes Issueds
a. To retire deb. 5g.
b. To provide for cost of
additions to Gadsden
plant.
. For Extensions, betterments
and working capital,
1936 - 99-3/8 - 98-3/i;
c
TABLE 7
INLAND STEEL! BONDED DEBT
(1933-1939)
Issued Maturity Outstanding Rat»
1. Inland Steel Co,, 1st. s.f, gold
UigJ Series Bj callablej coupon, 1931 1981 $l]4.,000,000
Purpose: Issued to reimburse Co.,
for expenditures made for
the erection of a wide




2. Inland Steel Co. Series C, 3g. 1936 37-U6 10,000,000 A
3. Inland Steel Co. 1st. s.f,
3-3Ag, Series Dj couponj callable 1936 1961 35>000,000 A
Purpose! Net proceeds of sale of
C & D Series used as
follows:
a. $ll!,lJ4.5,000 to redeem on Feb, 1,
1936, at 102j, $13,800,000 1st.
, series B, due 1981,
b. $26,1414.5,000 to redeem on Apr 1,
1936, 1st lilg due 1978,
c. Other corporate purposes.
U. Inland Steel Company 1st. s.f,
3s, series Ej couponj callable 1937 1952 10,000,000 -
Purpose: Issued to reimburse the
company's treasury for capital
expenditxires made in
1936 and to provide funds
for additional outlays on
its properties in 1937.
Sold Privately to Kiibn,
Loeb and Company NY at
a discount of 1^.
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TABLE 8
ADDITIONS TO CAPITAL OUTLAY FOR
COMPANIES IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY
1933-1939
(In Millions)
1933 193U 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
U. S, steel $39 $51 $58 $85 $111 $63 GO CO
Bethlehem 2 2 2k 15 ii5 7 11
Republic 6 9 11 18 39 h 9
Inland - -3 5 9 23 1 -1 *
TABLE 9
TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR CAPITAL GOODS
IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY
1933-1939
(In Millions)
1933 193U 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
$50 — $122 $200 $316 $132 $190
*
Years 193U-36, 38, 39 represent increases or decreases in total plant
and equipment (on balance sheet) rather than necessary additions.
hh
TABLE 10
GROSS REAL ESTATE, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT AS LISTED ON
BALANCE SHEETS OF COMPANIES IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY
1933-1939
(in Millions)
1933 193U 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
U. S, steel $2,li68 $2,965 $2,970 $2,231 $2,214; $2,214; $2,339
Bethlehem 7h5 719 736 732 771; 791 790
Republic 307 305 3ii6 360 381; 381; 389
Inland 73 70 75 81; 102 105 lOU
TABLE 11











Because of many technological innovations and the presence of top¬
flight managerial ability, the automobile industry has experienced a rapid
growth in comparison with other industries. Such factors as credit
regulations, increased disposable incomes and the increased number of
households have influenced car demand. As a result of this expansion, the
industry is generally the largest single consumer of such basic commodities
as steel, iron, plate glass, leather upholstery and rubber. Illustrated
in Table 12 are some of these primary materials and their percentage of
total United States consumption.
TABLE 12
SOME RAW MATERIALS USED IN THE
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
1933-1939
Per Gent of Total U, S. Consumption
Leather
Steel Iron Plate Glass Upholstery Rubber
1939 18.1 51.0 75.0 68.0 80.0
1938 16.9 53.0 69.0 6^.0 80.0
1937 20,0 5U.0 72.7 67.0 80.0
1936 20.3 53.0 73.0 ii6.0 80.0
1935 2U.8 5U.0 76.0 31.0 75.0
193k 21.0 57.0 70.0 Uo.o 75.0
1933 19.2 55.0 Uo.o 5U.0 73.0
Seciolarly, there is presumed to be a maximum number of cars that will
be operated. This is primarily due to changes in ownership, replacement
demand, state of confidence, prices of automobiles and operating cost.
There is necessary a maximxim ownership level at which potential owners
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strive and existing owiers, maror times, hope to maintain. Such changes in
ownership are inevitable because of non-static conditions in popvilation,
technological improvements and modernization of highways.
During the period of this study, 1933-1939# automobile purchases were
upward as a result of a tremendous back log of orders and/or availability
of disposable incomes. Prices, simultaneously, were increased. The
replacement demand factor became increasingly important following the
upward trend in purchases of new models. Later, cars previously bought,
proceeded by recent models, began to depreciate rapidly while new models
were introduced. At a particular point, consumers begin debate on replace¬
ment j some, with a view of buying "used” models to possess or attain
ownership, others, to maintain or acquire confidence in their purchase.
Whether a new or used replacement will materialize depends largely on
disposable income, operating cost and of course, dealers' stocks, both new
and used.
Quality is a big factor in determining the piirchase of a new model.
Generally conceived, the better the car qualitatively, the lower the
operating cost; along with the psychological factor, increased prestige.
Therefore, in addition to a level of maximum ownership, there is also an
optimum of quality for which consumers strive. The attainment of this
optimum, due mostly to rapid depreciation, tends to lag behind the realiza¬
tion of the ownership position.
When contemplating a purchase in the used car field, quality is included
among several other dominant factors. First, financing is less because
normally, the total cost is less, when considering a "trade-in," in
comparison with a new model bearing the same asime. Nevertheless, the
allowance offered on the trade-in may influence the seller to seek other
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dealers or keep his present vehicle longerj hoping that the trade-in value
will increase or decrease less proportionately than depreciation or
obsolescence will increase. If dealers' stocks are large, they tend to
lower their trade-in allowance until their sales turnover increases.
Instances where dealers did not tend to raise their trade-in allowances
when stocks were low, existed immediately following World War II. Dealers
became predominately purchasers of new models, later sold as used. The
demand was so great (in relation to supply) that potential customers, for
y
new models, traded in old ones with little or no concern on prevailing
allowances but emphasis on securing a later style.
The industry thus, is dependent upon both the purchase of new as well
as used cars. Preferences, substitutability and income disparity exert
influences which contribute to this kind of impact.
Capital Outlay
Beginning with 1933, General Motors had an increase of $12,721,751 in
their gross plant account, as per Table 13> which included additions to
plant of $9,176,963 as shown in Table lit. Of the $9,176,963, $8,071,753
was plant reinstated which had previously been designated as idle. There
is no available figure from Chrysler for additions to plant and equipment;
however, the company's gross real estate, plant and equipment account
declined by $1,287,315 because charges for depreciation and amortization,
together retirements, exceeded expenditures on new facilities. This too,
is illustrated in Table 13. General Motors registered no bond issues for
this period. Chrysler acquired (>% debentures of Dodge. The funded debt
for the industry was fljl million as compared with $U76 million for the steel
industry.
For the year 193k» General Motors expended |23j996,125 for plant outlay.
Of this amount, ^10,086,199 represented reinstatement of plant previously
designated as idle. Since the company's funded debt was zero, the net
increase in capital expenditures is presumed to have resulted from retained
earnings and/or bonds previously floated and subsequently retired prior to
this date.
Because the General Motors authorities believed tremendous potential
demand existed for consiuner goods in order to meet the unsatisfied desires
of the public. General Motors decided during the year of 1935 to reorganize,
readjust and expand its manufacturing facilities. For this purpose there
was appropriated, I50 million. Also during the year, the company spent
$51,160,000 for additions to plant. $7,5UO,000 of this amount was transferred
from idle plant to active plant while $12,560,000 was transferred from
active plant to idle plantj a net reduction of $5,020,000 in the gross plant
account. For this same year, the company spent $27,163,875 more on plant
improvements. Chrysler's capital expenditures for the year were $11,387,671.
Neither company floated a bond issuej however, Chrysler retired the 1933
7% $2 million debentures of Dodge. Illustrated in Table l5 are expenditures
for the industry, which were $130 million. Total funded debt was $21
million or S% of lij-UU million for the steel industry.
At the end of 1936, General Motors continued to be optimistic with
respect to expanded automobile purchases. The $50 million appropriation
became a reality sQ-though total expenditures would be considerably (in the
long-run) in excess of the amount originally proposed. Gross plant
expenditures were $66,793,767, sai increase during the year of $15,633,767.
Thus, General Motors' expenditures represented h3% of 1die total ($l53 million)
for the industry. During this year, the company floated two bond issuesj
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million 3g and ^^0 million Uig* The former is a ten year issue while
the latter is for fifteen years. In view of their expansion program, we
contend that net proceeds from these issues will primarily be used for
capital expenditures. Gross additions, under Chrysler, amounted to $21
million, an increase of $10 million over plant expenditures for 1935. This
$21,650,503 included, among other items, a new Desoto factory, a modern
press plant, and the re-opening of a plant in Dayton, Ohio. The expendi¬
tures, along with General Motors, accounted for $6% of total expenditures
for the industry. Hudson, another automobile fim, had serial 6g maturing
for the year. The total bonded debt for the industry was $1^ millionj a
decrease of $6 million from 1935. As contrasted with the steel industry,
this represented only 2.9^ of the latter’s funded debt.
Continuing to take the lead. General Motors Corporation, as a result of
concluding that its present facilities were inadequate (particularly the
Chevrolet Division), authorized expenditures of $61,725,000 for expansion
and improvements. This amoiint is in addition to normal expenditures for
tooling and plant rearrangement. The company expended $itii,l50,000 for 1937J
$22,6ii3,676 less than expenditures for 1936, or a decrease of 50^.
Chrysler spent $21,915,325 for such purposes-. Total expenditures for the
industry were increased by $6 million. None of the companies floated bond
issues. Nevertheless, Hedson had an issue of serial maturing during
s
the year. This is illustrated in Table l6. The funded debt was decreased
by $1 million. The steel industry's debt also showed a decrease; the
amount being $8 million. Notwithstanding this, the funded debt for the
automobile industry (Table 17) was still 2,9^ of the debt for the steel
industry.
During the latter part of 1937 and the first half of 1938, there xjas a
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sharp decline in business activity in the United States, This decline
became a major concern of all industries. It is difficult to pin point any
factor(s) but the recovery period -was partly affected by a decrease in
consumption. Simultaneously, producers generally believed that 65^ of the
production equipment involving the metal goods industries was ten years old.
Thus, at this time, a large part of America's producing plant was obsolete.
Beginning with the second half of 1938, a reversal took place
causing the general trend of business activity to move forward. General
Motors expended #32 million on plantsj a decrease from 1937 of $12 million,
Chrysler spent |l8,2i;6,y4.8; or a decrease of $3 million. Expenditures for
the industry were $l55 million or lU million less than 1937, Emphasis
apparently has been shifted from plant expansion to evolution and techno¬
logical progress of the industry, Graheun-Paige had bonds, 1st 6^ maturing
for 1938, but there were no recorded issues for the industry. The bonded
debt for automobiles was $12 million or a decrease of $2 million} whereas
the bonded debt for the steel industry was $66? million or an increase of
$171 million.
An examination of 1939 for this industry, reveals that business
activity declined at the beginning of the year and resumed its upward
movement towards the end. Since new models are generally introduced during
the early months of a year, potential consumers may delay p-urchasing in
order to secure a later model. This may be one factor, previously not
mentioned, which causes automobile sales to be relatively low at the very
beginning and end of a year. The upswing for the last months of 1939 may
have been accelerated by the crisis in Europe, Fearful of government
restrictions on production of commodities in the metal industries, buyers
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made piirchases -sdiich ordinarily would have been delayed.
General Motors produced, and/or added among other things, the Hydra-
Matic Drive which is evidence of the emphasis placed on innovation. As a
result, plant expendittares were $37 million or $5 million more than 1938.
The primary reason for this increase was to maintain the efficiency of the
company's production facilities with advancing technology. Ejqaenditures
of |l6,2Ul,106 were recorded by Chrysler. This amount is $2 million less
than 1938. Total capital expenditures for the industry were $135 million
or $l5 million less than 1938. General Motors and Chrysler accounted for
39^ of this total. No bonds were issued for this period. The funded debt
for the automobile industry was reduced by $1; million. The $65l million
funded debt of the steel industry represented a decline of only $16 million.
Thus, the $8 million funded debt for the automobile industry was a fraction
(1.3^) of the debt of the steel industry.
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TABLE 13
GROSS REAL ESTATE, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT AS LISTED ON
BALANCE SHEETS OF COMPANIES IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
1933-1939
(In Millions)
1933 193li 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
General Motors $512 $5ia $592 $690 $7U7 $758 $769
Chrysler 128 129 llii 117 116 118 115
Packard U5 35 35 35 35 31 28
Studebaker 67 67 67 16 18 19 19
Hudson 2ii 22 20 19 18 18 17
TABLE Hi
ADDITIONS TO CAPITAL OUTUY FOR
COMPANIES IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
1933-1939
(In Millions)
1933 193U 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
General Motors $9 $23 $51 $66 $lili $32 $37
Chrysler 11 21 21 18 16
TABLE 15
TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR CAPITAL GOODS
IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
1933-1939
(In Millions)
1933 193U 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
$U8 178 $130 $153 $159 $l55 $135
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TABLE 16
FIRMS IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY: FUNDED DEBT
1933-1939
Rating
1. General Motors - a. $50,000,000 3^ dated 1936 due 19U6s
b. 150,000,000 3i„ dated 1936 due 1951s
Average Price
1936 1937 1938
a. lOUJ 10l| 103
b. lOU 10l| 103i
2. Chrysler - 6% debentwes of Dodge dated 1933
Authorized: $2,000,000. Retired 1935*
3. Hudson - a, Ui-g, due 1937-'ii-0
b. 6 , due 1936-'UO
s
U. Graham-Paige - a. 1st 6., due 1937 B
b. 1st 6g, due 1938 B
c. 1st 6_, due 191+3 Caas
5. Studebaker - a, 6 , dated 1932 due 191+2 (i;6^-20i) Oaa
s
b. 6„, dated 1935 due 191+5 B
Average Price
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
b. lOi+l 68 108j 66J 88|
TABLE 17
AUTOMOBILE IKDUSTRI: FUNDED DEBT
1933-1939
(In Millions)
1933 193U 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
lUi $32 $21 $15 $1U $12 $8
Pennsylvania, Ohio and Detroit Railroad Company
The Pennsylvania, Ohio and Detroit Railroad Company operates trains in
Ohio and Michigan. The total miles of track in 1933 'was l,5lU.l6 as compared
with l,li.37.20 in 1939. The company floated one bond issue during the period
of 1933-1939. Net proceeds of previous bond issues (Table 18) were
primarily used for capital expenditures.
Expenditures on plant outlay for this company (as in most railroad
companies) have been tremendous, as illustrated in Table 19. beginning
with 1933j the company had capital expenditures of 1^98.7 million. This
was increased by approximately $83 million for 1935. For 1936, there was
an increase of $100 million. Thus, the $783 million is about seven times the
amount for the automobile industry and three times that of the entire steel
industry. Pennsylvania expended $826.7 million for 1937; an increase of
$L|.6 million. For 1938 and 1939» the company's capital expenditures declined
to levels approximating the 1935 and 1936 rates. This trend was ailso
noticeable in the automobile and steel industries.
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TABLE 18
PENl^SILVANIA, OHIO AND DETROIT RAILROAD COMPANY;
FUNDED DEBT
1933-1939
Issued Maturity Rating1,Penn,, Ohio & Detroit R.R. Co., 1st &
refunding gold series Aj callable 1927 1977 Aa
Purpose: Issued for capital expenditures,




1933 193k 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
82 9h^ lOiil 105i 103i 93j 96i
2, Penn., Ohio & Detroit R, R, Co., 1st &
refunding gold U^-g series B, Outstanding;
I3,9lt3,000. 1931 1981 Aa
Purpose; Issued to Penn, R.R. in partial
reimbursement for expenditures
and capital advances,
3. Penn., Ohio & Detroit R.R. Co., 14.^^^ callable
Issued in settlement of indebtedness, 193U 1981; Aa
TABLE 19
ADDITIONS TO CAPITAL OUTLAY FOR
PENNSYLVANIA, OHIO AND DETROIT RAILROAD COMPANY
1933-1939
(In Millions)
1933 193li 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
$598.7 $637.5 $681.9 $783 $826.7 $676.5 $765.9
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In examining the natiire of interest, three principal points are
introduced; namely, the definitions of interest and interest rates; various
approaches to the determination of interest rates; and the relationship
between short and long-term interest rates.
Interest is the price or amoiint paid for the use of borrowed funds or
their equivalent. It becomes a part of the principal or amount granted as
the loan. The rate of interest is a ratio or percentage of the payment for
any given loan per unit of time. The real and nominal rates are the two
rates introduced. The nominal rate is the quoted rate whereas the real rate
is the actual rate which is higher than the former. In Chapter II, we have
tried to explain that the term, ”the interest rate,” is used to mean a
family of rates rather than an absolute rate.
Alternative approaches to the determination of the interest rate was
the next area of discussion. These approaches are classified under monetary
or classical and non-monetary or anti-classical. The first group comprises
the liquidity preference theory and the loanable funds theory. The former
embodies a money concept whereas the latter is predicated upon loans. The
theories are based on the demand for and supply of money or loanable funds.
Keynes’ liquidity approach is based on three motives; namely. Transactions;
Precautionary and Speculative. The first two motives are functions of
income while the third motive is a f-unction of the rate of interest. Their
purpose is to explain why money is held at any given time. The rate of
interest is said to be that point at which the demand for and supply of
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money or loanable funds are equated. For Keynes, it will not fall below
zero.
The time preference and productivity theories represent the non¬
monetary group. Suggested in the first principle is a preference for
present over future goods. To forego immediate consumption, the potential
consumer must receive a reward. This reward is an interest payment. The
rate, as suggested by proponents of this theory, will be positive. The
productivity theory of capital is the second principle iinder the non¬
monetary group. The rate of interest is determined by the marginal net
physical productivity of capital.
The final point discussed in Chapter II is the distinction between the
short and long-term interest rate. Even though subsidiary factors are
mentioned, the primary difference is the element of risk. A comparison is
made between the short and long-term bond, illustrating the greater risk
attached to the latter.
Next, we discuss the theory of investment. A distinction is made
between gross and net investment, followed by an examination of factors
affecting private investment. This difference has been explained in terms
of the composition of these two. Gross investment is composed of producers•
durable equipment, new construction, net foreign investment and changes in
business inventories. Net investment is net addition to capital equipment.
Major factors affecting the level of private investment are expectations
and the rate of interest. Entrepreneurs tend to seek that level of invest¬
ment which yields them the greatest net return. However, a fluctuation of
the interest rate may adversely affect the expected yield. An example of a
long-term h.% bond, selling for $100, is given in Chapter III,
Another prerequisite to an understanding of the long-term interest
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rate and its effect on capital investment is investment demand. In Chapter
IV, the attempt has been made to broaden the concepts, of both the business
cycle and those affecting the level of private investment, by showing their
effect on changes in the business cycle. Economic fluctuations are
discussed} followed by a transition from prosperity to a depressed economy.
Two causes are given for this transition. The first cause is the Keynesian
description of a collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital. There is
a decrease in the net return to investment} hence, a tapering off or
cessation of capital investment. The acceleration principle is applied to
the second cause. From this, it is presumed that underconsumption brought
about an accelerated decrease in capital expenditures. In moving to a
state of recovery, we have suggested at least two approaches. The first
approach is the favorable outlook for profits} the liquidation of final
inventories} and the initiation of replacement expenditures. The second
method involves Schumpeter’s innovation theory of introducing technological
improvements, new sales schedules, new products, etc.
The empirical investigation is concerned primarily with the leading
firms in the automobile and steel industries. A seventh firm under railroads,
is included to illustrate, the huge capital requirements for that type of
organization. The period of study is seven years: 1933-1939• To conclude
the investigation, we present a correlation analysis which shows the
relationship between investment and rates of interest for the steel and
automobile industries.
In addition to the production of steel, the steel industry is the
world's largest single producer of cement. It is an industry controlled
chiefly by three firms, namely, United States Steel, Bethlehem and Republic
Steel. Capital requirements for the industry are relatively high.
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The automobile industry is also dominated by a so-called ”big three."
The leading producers are General Motors, Chrysler and Ford, who form a
nucleus in the industry making it generally the largest single consumer of
such basic commodities as steel, iron, plate glass and rubber. The market
is one where rapid turnover of used cars is essential to the successful
selling of new models.
For 1933> total expenditures for the automobile industry amounted to
$U8 million as compared to I50 million for the steel industry. The
Pennsylvania, Ohio Railroad Company alone, had expenditures of 1598.7 million.
Such tremendous expenditures for this railroad company are feasible since
the majority of assets of railroad companies are held in the form of capital
equipment. Practically all of the expenditures (railroad), for this and
subsequent years, were made from funds representing the flotation of long¬
term bonds. Most of the expenditures under the steel industry were made
possible from funds of long-term bond issues. Capital expenditiires for the
automobile industry (throughout the investigation) were generally evenly
divided between funds from long-term bond issues and retained earnings.
During 1935> capital expenditures for the automobile industry were
increased by #82 million or 62^ over the two year period. The steel
industry expended #122 million or an increase of #72 million over the same
period. Total expenditures for the automobile industry exceeded those of
the steel industry by #8 million.
In 1936, the automobile industry expended of the amount spent by
the steel industry. Expenditures for the steel industry rose by 39^ over
the year while the automobile industry had an increase of 1^.9^ from 1935*
The railroad company's expenditures were increased by #102 million or 13^.
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The automobile industry, for V)yiy had expendit\ires of million or
only $14. million more than 1936, whereas the steel industry registered a 68^
increase. This happened because all firms in the industry expended more in
1937 than for any previous or sebsequent year (1933-1939). Pennsylvania
Railroad continued to show an increase. The company had expenditures of
$826,7 millionj an increase of |l43,7 million.
Previously, all of the firms in the two industries have been engaged
in expansion programs. The completion or near-completion of these programs
are observable by a tapering off of capital expendit\jres during the next
two years. For 1938 and 1939, the automobile industry had expenditures
approximating the 1936 and 1939 levels. Expenditures for the steel industry
were |63 million and $88 million respectively. The Pennsylvania Company
had expenditures equivalent to the 193$ and 1936 levels.
The fiinded debt for the steel industry fluctuated during the period
(1933-1939)» whereas it continued to decrease in the automobile industry.
This debt, for the steel industry, was generally four-hundred times that of
the automobile industry. It is understandable since the steel industry is
primarily a capital goods industry whereas the automobile industry engages
principally in the transformation of goods (capital) into other goods
(cons4uner).
Capital expenditures for the steel and automobile indiistries, for 1933-
1-939f represented new additions and/or the reinstatement of idle plant to
active plant. There were instances of decreases in the net amount of
capital expenditures where depreciation and retirements exceeded expenditures
on new facilities. Capital expenditures for the Pennsylvania, Ohio and
Detroit Railroad Company (1933-1939) were equivalent to like expenditures for
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the steel industry. Outlay for railroads, which is abundant, is composed
chiefly of "rolling stock;" of which the rate of depreciation is relatively
high.
TfJhen expectations were relatively high, entrepreneurs organized and/or
carried out expansion programs irrespective of the rate of interest. When
businessmen anticipated sharp decreases in expected returns on new outlays,
capital expenditures were generally reduced regardless of the rate of interest
on long-term seciorities. However, practically all bond indentures included
a callable clause. Thvis, when the market rate of interest decreased, bonds





































The coefficient of correlation for the steel and automobile industries
was negative} that is, at lower rates of interest, capital investment tended
to increase and vice-versa. The correlation for the steel industry (-,255)>
suggests a very low relationship between capitsil investment and rates of
interest. The correlation for the automobile industry (-.814.2), suggests a
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